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Changing a Partnership Into a CorporationSome Considerations Affecting the Time When
Incorporation May Benefit the Owners of
a Growing Business
Daniel J. Gifford*
In this article Professor Gifford discusses some of the factors which

are relevant to a decision with respect to the stage at which a growing
business should be transformed from a partnership to a corporation.
The transformation of the form of business organization from that
of a partnership into that of a corporation should be undertaken only
after a consideration and a balancing of the relative advantages and
disadvantages, to each of the persons constituting the partnership, of
doing business under each of the respective forms.' To the extent
that partnership law and corporate law permit contractual changes
in the structure or effects of such business organizations from that
which would be their structure or effects in the absence of contract,
the owners of a business utilizing either form have a free hand in
shaping the business organization to suit their particular purposes;
they need not, therefore, make an all-or-nothing choice between two
types of organization, each of which differs radically from the other
in several characteristics, but, within wide limits, may pick and choose
from among all of the characteristics often attributed to either of the
two forms of organization for those which best fulfill their needs.
The present essay will deal only with those businesses which possess unlimited growth potential in respect of the amount of assets
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. The potential advantages of incorporation have been variously described. See,
BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 19 n.1 (1959): insulation from liability,
federal income tax considerations, continuity of existence, centralization of management,
and free transferability of interests; Paul & Kalish, Transition from a Partnership to a
Corporation, N.Y.U. 18r INST. ON FED. TAx 639-41 (1960): unlimited life, limited
liability of stockholders, "ready" transferability of interests, tax advantages of spreading
income, fringe benefits, family income spreading, and conversion of earnings to capital
gains by a future sale of stock. Corporate disadvantages are listed by the latter
authors as double taxation and unavailability of corporate losses to offset other income
of shareholders. See also Kahn, Organization and Growth of a Partnership,id. at 615,
637-38; Gibson, Selecting the Form of Entity for Small Business, 18 Bus. LAw. 100

e.g.,

(1962).
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which they can profitably employ in the production of income. If such
businesses grow sufficiently, they will probably ultimately reach
the stage of publicly held corporations. 2 The reasons for this will
vary, although it would seem that once the growth process has picked
up momentum, the business may require capital at a rate faster than
earnings can be accumulated or funds can be obtained from lenders. 3
At such a time incorporation may be a practical necessity because the
sale of ownership interests among many investors may be an essential
means of raising needed capital and the relative ease with which
corporate ownership interests may be transferred 4 may make that
form of organization more compatible with widespread holdings of
ownership interests. Furthermore, even prior to the public holding
stage, incorporation may be necessary as a device with which to
maximize earnings available for reinvestment 5 and as a means of
accommodating the differing interests of several classes of investors or
among investors of the same class in respect of participation in
control S over the affairs of the business and limited liability.'
The scope of the present essay will be confined to a brief consideration of the factors of transferability of ownership interests, owner
liability, control structure, financial structure, and certain tax effects
as such factors may bear on the decision of the proper time to incorporate prior to the public holding stage.
2. BMAxE & CAY, CASES ON CORn'ORATIONS 19 (1959).
3. Compare McLain, Why and How We Went Public, in 2 Conp. PnAc. CoMMENTATOR no. 2 p. 34, 35 (1960).
4. See p. 356 infra.
5. See pp. 364-67 infra.
6. See pp. 359-65, 371-72 infra.
7. See pp. 358-59, 363, 371-72 infra.
8. Since not directly related to the determination of the time at which growth will
impel incorporation, the supposed partnership attribute of uncertain continuity of life
is not treated herein. Such attribute is often considered as deriving from the provisions
of § 31 of the Uniform Partnership Act which provide that dissolution of the partnership will be caused by the death of any partner or by the express will of any partner
although in contravention of the partnership agreement. The "dissolution" that occurs on the death of a partner does not compel the liquidation of the partnership
business by the remaining partners, and partnership agreements often provide for the
continuance of such business after the death of one or more partners. See UNIFORM
PARTNERsHP ACT § 41(3). Thus the interest of the deceased partner may be purchased
by the survivors pursuant to provisions so providing in the partnership agreement,
Silverthorne v. Mayo, 238 N.C. 274, 77 S.E.2d 678 (1953), and the funds for such
purchase can be supplied from life insurance. See Note, The Use of Life Insurance To
Fund Agreements Providing for Dispositionof a Business Interest, 71 HAv. L. REv. 687
(1958). The power conferred by § 31 upon each partner to force a "dissolution" in
contravention of the partnership agreement merely requires the remaining partners either
to pay the partner forcing dissolution the value of his interest in the partnership (less
damages for forcing dissolution in breach of the partnership agreement) or to post bond
to secure such payment at the end of the partnership term and to indemnify him against
partnership liabilities. The latter alternative method of dealing with the interest of the
partner forcing dissolution permits the remaining partners to use the former's property in
the partnership business until the end of the previously agreed-upon term at the
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I. TRANSFERABILI OF OWNERSHIP INTERESTS
A. IN GENERAL
The growth stage of the business will usually substantially influence the extent to which transferability or non-transferability of
ownership interests is a desirable factor; the growth stage will also
influence the kinds of ownership interests to which transferability
would be desirable, if it is determined that less than all of the owner-

ship interests should be transferable. By definition, restrictions on
transfer would be incompatible with a business which had reached
the stage of public trading of its ownership interests. Restrictions on

transfer are often desired, however, by the owners in control of a
closely-held business in order to preserve existing harmonious personal relations among themselves or to preserve present power
relationships; non-controlling owners may similarly desire some restrictions over transfer as assurance that the present owners in control,
whose judgment and discretion are trusted by them, will not be
replaced by successor controlling owners whose judgment and discretion may be less worthy of such trust.9 Restrictions on transfer,
expense only of a bond to secure the specified payment and indemnity. While the
bond expense may be substantial, it would appear to be less than the expense involved
in immediate payment for the partnership interest, and since damages resulting from
the dissolution in breach of contract are recoverable from the partner forcing such
dissolution and may be deducted from the value of his partnership interest, the financial
burden imposed upon the business or the remaining partners by such forced dissolution
would be reduced still further. If the cost of the bond is an item of damages and is
presently recoverable from the partner causing the dissolution in breach of agreement,
such financial burden would appear to amount only to the attorneys' fees incurred in
collecting such damages. Section 31, therefore, would not directly interfere with business continuity by compelling termination of the business by legal command, and on
the above interpretation, would not so interfere indirectly, with the exception hereinafter pointed out, by imposing financial burdens on the business which would jeopardize
its continued existence.
In the case in which the business did not have the prospect of a profitable future,
§ 31 might have the effect of speeding up its ultimate liquidation, however, by making
the bond expense non-reimburseable by the partner forcing the liquidation. Such
result might occur if, because of the lack of expectation of future business profits, the
remaining partners were deemed to be under a duty to mitigate damages by foregoing payment of such bond expense and immediately liquidating the business.
A perhaps somewhat more substantial basis for attributing an uncertain continuity
of life to a partnership would lie in the lack of flexibility of that form in respect of
combining limited liability, sharing of profits, and participation in control. Such lack
of flexibility would impede the transition by the business from a stage in which it
was operated entirely by owner-managers to stages in which it was operated, at
least in part, by hired, non-owner managers-a transition which time might require
it to make if it is to outlast the lives of presently existing general partners. Cf. p. 364
infra.
9. Reliance by non-controlling owners upon the characters of the controlling owners
is reflected, for example, in several provisions of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
which prohibit the admission of a new general partner without the consent of the
limited partners, §§ 9(1)(e), 24(2)(d), although the act contemplates a certificate
provision conferring on general partners the power to admit new limited partners,
§ 9(1)(f), and conferring on each of the limited partners the power to confer on
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accordingly, would seem to be most strongly desired as applied to
the transfer of ownership interests which carry with them any appreciable participation in control over the operations of the business. 10
Furthermore, to the extent that an original, cohesive group of controlling owners is diluted by the admission of additional owners with
whom control is shared, the desirability of maintaining restrictions on
transfer may be diminished. In so far, however, as section 911 of the
Uniform Partnership Act confers on general partners a power to bind
their partnership despite their lack of authority to do so, an additional
reason for restricting transfers of general partnership interests would
exist. If growth requires the enlargement of the "ownership base" of
the business, the original controlling owners may desire to retain control in themselves and accordingly may continue to restrict transfer of
their interests; but in order to facilitate the sale of ownership interests
not sharing in control, they may choose not to impose restrictions on
the transfer of the latter interests.
B.

CompA A=TVE ADAPTABiLrrY OF Co1RoRATE AND PARTNERSmP
FoRMs TO FACILITATING OR BESTRICriNG TRANSFER

The power to restrict absolutely the transfer of that part of ownership interests which share in the "management or administration" of
the business and a power to inhibit the transfer of that part of ownership interests which do not share in management or administration are
conferred by statute in the case of a partnership. Section 18(g) of
the Uniform Partnership Act provides that in the absence of an agree-their respective assignees the right to become substituted limited partners, §§ 19(4),
-.25(4).
10. To the extent that control over most business affairs is concentrated in a few

hands, the difficulties connected with transfers to outsiders would appear to be
lessened. Since transfers to outsiders would seem to create problems to the degree

'that the interest transferred possessed some but not all of the power of control over the
affairs of the business, transfers of interests having little or no such power would theoxetically present no great personal relations difficulties for the remaining owners. Except

to the extent that the judgment and discretion of the respective individuals owning
interests possessing substantial powers of control were trusted and relied upon by
the non-controlling owners, sales of such interests would similarly fail to create personal
xelations difficulties to the degree that the interests sold possessed all of the power of
control over all aspects of the business, since, by hypothesis, there would be no
remaining members of a controlling group which would be forced to share their power
,with a stranger if all of such power were transferred.
11. UNIFoRm P asmNERS AcT § 9 provides in part:
"(I) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership
of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has
in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person

with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.

"(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the
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ment to the contrary: "No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners." Although section 27(1)12
of the act indicates that even though the partnership agreement prohibits an assignment of a partnership interest, an assignment of such
an interest in a going partnership business in contravention of such
agreement will be effective to vest in the assignee the assignor's right
to receive the profits of the business, such section gives effect to section 18(g) and to the desire of owners of a closely held business to
restrict transfers of interests sharing in control by providing that
unless otherwise agreed by all of the partners, such assignee receives
no right to interfere in the "management or administration" of the
partnership business or affairs. In addition, section 27(1) inhibits
transfers even of the right to share in business profits by denying to
assignees of partners, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
certain remedial rights against the partnership possessed by their
assignors, i.e., the rights to require information or accounting of part13
nership transactions and to inspect partnership books.
Although section 19(1) of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
states that "a limited partner's interest is assignable," the assignee of a
limited partner, unless and until he becomes a "substituted limited
partner," is entitled only to his assignor's right to share in the profits of
the business or return of contribution, 14 but is denied remedial rights
against the partnership similar to those that section 27(1), in the absence of an agreement otherwise providing, denies to the assignee of a
general partner to whose admission to the partnership the other
partners have not consented. 15 Since an assignee of a limited partner
partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction."

Section 9 would appear to be modified by § 3(1) of that Act which provides:
"A person has 'knowledge' of a fact within the meaning of this act not only when
he has actual knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such other

facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith."
12. UNIFORM PARTNznsI-

AcT § 27(1): "A conveyance by a partner of his

interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership, nor, as against
the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee, during the
continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or administration of
the partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the

assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning
partner would otherwise be entitled."
13. See UNIFORM PARTNESla p ACT §§ 19-22. Despite the apparent divestiture by §
27(1) of a mere assignee of the rights created by the foregoing sections, the enforcement by such assignee of his right to share in the profits may require an accounting.
Cf. 2 ROWLEY, PARTNEsHm § 53.20, at 584 (1960).

14. UNIFORM LInIE PARarEsmp ACT § 19(3): "An assignee, who does not
become a substituted limited partner, has no right to require any information or
account of the partnership transactions or to inspect the partnership books; he is only
entitled to receive the share of the profits or other compensation by way of income,

or the return of his contribution, to which his assignor would otherwise be entitled."
15. Ibid; UNIFORM PxnTN-nsmp ACT § 27(1).
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has no right to become a substituted limited partner over the objection
of any partner unless the limited partnership certificate so provides, 1
the assignment of the right to share in business profits can be inhibited under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act as well as under
the Uniform Partnership Act by the denial of the same remedial rights
to assignees.
Corporate stock, on the other hand, is, in the absence of an agreement or a certificate of incorporation or a by-law provision to the
contrary, freely transferable; 17 the transferee receives the same right
to receive dividends, the same right to share in control of the corporation, and the same remedial rights against the corporation as were
possessed by his transferor. Such transferability, however, often can
be greatly restricted by contract, by law or certificate of incorporation
provision. 8 Because an absolute prohibition on the transfer of stock
in a business corporation would, in most cases, be of doubtful validity, 19 restrictions on the transfer of corporate stock often take the form
of vesting in the shareholders or in the corporation a right of first
refusal with respect to impending transfers of shares by the stockholders.20 The power which can be confened upon the owners of a
corporation over the identity of assignees of ownership interests
succeeding to a right to participate in control, therefore, may be
somewhat less efficacious than the power which can be conferred
upon the owners of a partnership since the exercise of such right
of first refusal in respect of inter vivos transfers depends upon the
continuing financial ability and willingness of the corporation or its
stockholders to exercise such right of first refusal.21 Theoretically,
16. U -om Lnwro PARTNERsHap ACr § 19(4).
17. See, e.g., 12 FLETcHER, PRvATE CORPORAMTONS § 5480 (1957);
STOCK TRANSFE

Cf. UNIFORM

ACT § 15.

18. See, e.g., 12 Frsrcm,

op. cit. supra note 17, § 5453; 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE COm'ORA-

§ 7.14 (1958).
19. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 542, 141 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1957)
(dictum).
20. See, e.g., Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930); Hassel v.
Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 212 N.Y. Supp. 561 (1925); Note, Control Deces, 52
TIONS

Nw. U.L. REv. 375, 382 (1957).
21. In deciding whether to exercise such right of first refusal, the financial impact

upon the business or other right-of-first-refusal holders would be balanced against

the desire to maintain control over the identity of new owners who would participate
in control over business affairs. Operating to reduce such impact would be the fact
that the right-of-first-refusal holders would not be called upon to make a determination
of whether or not to exercise the right until an owner desiring to be rid of his investment had found a purchaser who was willing to purchase at a price satisfactory
to such owner. Finding such a purchaser for a minority interest in a closely held
business might in itself present some difficulty, and such difficulty would be increased
by the right of first refusal in the business or other owners which would prevent
the transferor from consummating the sale with a prospective purchaser until the
business or other right-of-first-refusal holders had been informed and had been given
an opportunity to make the purchase. Furthermore, the likelihood of finding such a
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therefore, the partnership form would seem to possess some degree of
advantage with respect to the ability to restrict inter vivos transfers of
ownership interests sharing in control; whether that theoretical advantage would be an actual advantage would depend upon a practical
appraisal of the financial resources of the business and its owners.
With respect to facilitating the transferability of interests not participating in control, the partnership form would seem to be disadvantageous, and the disadvantages of such form would seem to
multiply as the number of partners increased. Transfers of an ownership interest not having a right to participate in control and which was
clothed in limited partnership garb in order to avoid the risk of
personal liability for business debts being imposed upon its owner, 2
would be governed by the transfer provisions of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act. That act provides that the assignees of limited partners cannot succeed to the statutory remedial rights against the
partnership possessed by their assignors unless and until they become
substituted limited partners.23 Even though a limited partnership
certificate expressly grants the right to assignees of limited partners to
become substituted limited partners, 24 such assignees do not become such until the limited partnership certificate is amended.2 Since
the amendment of a limited partnership certificate requires the signature of all of the members of the partnership, 2 the amendment procedure may be somewhat cumbersome; and when many partnership
interests are outstanding, it may be impossible of accomplishment.,2 7
Although the lack of adaptability of the limited partnership form to
ownership among a substantial number of persons does not absolutely
preclude the use of such form even after the business begins substantially to expand its ownership base,' 8 it will be a factor which
when added to tax and control factors may influence the owners
toward a decision to incorporate.
purchaser would diminish in the times when the business was not prospering and
consequently when it and the other right-of-first-refusal holders might be least able
to exercise the right of first refusal without incurring substantial hardship. Control
over the identity of persons succeeding to an ownership interest on the death of its
holder could be effected under both the partnership and corporate forms through the
life insurance device. See note 8 supra.
22. See p. 358 infra. But the use of profit-sharing creditor type instruments may
provide an alternative means of investment in a partnership, see pp. 362-63 infra, which
would not be governed by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
23. UNIFoR Ln sira PARTNERsHIP AcT § 19(3), quoted note 14 upra.
24. The certificate may so provide. UNswoPm Lnmsrrx PArNEnssIP AcT § 19(4).
25. UNiFoRm LI mD PRTNcRSuns
AcT § 19(5).
26. Id.§25(1)(b).
27. Cf. 2 RoWLEy, ?PRTNESH"p § 53.19 (1960), quoted note 28 infra.
28. Thus in the area of real estate syndications where there is no need for raising
additional capital by reinvestment of earnings, the absence of double taxation of
earnings in the partnership form has often impelled the use of limited partnerships
despite the transfer disadvantages. Compare Aronsohn, Changing Nature of Real Estate
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II. OWNER LI M.rrY FOR BUSINESS DEBTS
Although the partners of a partnership and the so-called general
partners of a limited partnership are personally and jointly liable for
the debts of the partnership, 29 an investor in a partnership business
may become a "limited" partner-a partner whose liability is confined
to his capital contribution and to his share of undistributed earnings 3°
-upon compliance by him and by the other partners with certain
formalities prescribed in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.' A
condition of such limitation of liability of the limited partner, how32
ever, is that he may not take "part in the control of the business";
the meaning of the quoted phrase will be examined below in connection with the consideration of the relative adaptability of the partnership and corporate forms to varying control structures. Here it will
merely be noted that the partnership form precludes the combination
of limited liability with taking part in "control" of a business.
The owners of a corporate business, on the other hand, are endowed
by law with limited liability for the debts of the business 33 and such
limited liability is not conditioned on the non-exercise of control. Although this limited liability may be subject to criticism in the case of
a "one-man corporaton,"3 1 it would appear increasingly desirable from
the viewpoint of the owners and objectively justified as the number
of owners increases and control is separated in growing degrees from
ownership. Like most other corporate attributes, however, limited
liability is subject to contractual modification, and in the case of a
small, closely held corporation, one or more of its shareholders often
Syndicates, N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 63, 64-65 (1960):
"[I]t is apparent that a large majority of the real estate syndicates organized over
the past two years have been organized either as joint ventures or as limited partnerships. The overwhelming majority of them have been organized as limited
partnerships under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been enacted
in approximately 38 jurisdictions."
with 2 RowLEY, PA TNERamP § 53.19 (1960):

"The provisions of the articles of limited partnership of most present day real estate
syndicates taking that form, permitting transfer of their interests by limited partners
but, for practical reasons owed to the large number of limited partners, not requiring amendment of the certificate, highlights this problem of the anomalous
status of assignees of limited partnership interests who are not limited partners."
29. UNwom r PAmNmisip AcT § 15; U~nwomvR LLa-mu PARTNERsmp AcT § 9(1).
Such partners are jointly and severally liable for certain tortious conduct. UNFORm
P.RTNmasmp AcT § 15(a); UNnoRm Lmrnmr PArTNERsHmP AcT § 9(1).
30. UNIwoRm

Lnmn-an PARTNmEsmp AcT § 7.

31. Id. § 2.
32. Id. § 7: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless,

in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part
in the control of the business."
33. See, e.g., Bottlers' Seal Co. v. Rainey, 243 N.Y. 333, 346, 153 N.E. 437, 442
(1926).
34. See Note, Judicial Supervision of the One Man Corporation,45 HARv. L. Rrv.

1084, 1089 (1932).
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guarantee the obligations of the corporation.35 Business necessity
would in many cases dictate the making of such guarantees when a
small partnership business or a partnership business heavily burdened
with debt committments was changed into a corporate business, since
credit availability may depend upon the financial strength of one or
more of its owners.36 To the extent of these guarantees, therefore,
such owner or owners partake of liabilities similar to those of a
general partner; and in such cases and as respects such owner or
owners and to the extent of such guarantees, the corporate form
would not possess an attractiveness based upon liability limitation.
Moreover, to the extent that such guarantees are made by less than
all of the owners, the guarantor-owners may partake of liabilities in
excess of those of general partners since they would have no right of
contribution 37 from the owners who have not given such guarantees.
Only when the size of the business and its financial resources have
grown to the point that the financial strength of the owners ceases
to be a factor in the availability of credit to the business, therefore,
is the full benefit of limited liability obtainable for all of its owners
through the medium of incorporation.
III. CONTROL STUcTraE
A high degree of flexibility in the government of a business is
possible under both the partnership and corporate forms. Although
partnership government is sometimes conceived as involving a dispersion of control and a structure in which all of the partners participate
in making many decisionsm and corporate government is often conceived as centering exclusive control over operations of the business in
the board of directors, 39 neither form must conform to such conceptions in all circumstances. Thus the government of a partnership can be concentrated in the hands of managing partners4° or of
an executive committee,41 voting power can be distributed among the
partners in the forms of weighted votes and non-voting partners, and
separate classes of partners, resembling the separate classes of stock
sometimes found in corporations, can be established. The government
of a corporation, on the other hand, need not be centralized but may
35. Note, Corporate Formation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 352, 354 (1957); Note, Capitalization, id. at 365.
36. Cf. Lewis, The Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 717-18
(1917).
37. The right of contribution exists only when the partnership agreement does not
otherwise provide. UNxoium PA sTNEasim AcT § 18.
38. Such is the structure of partnership government in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary. UNIFoRM PARmTmSan, AcT § 18(h).
39. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960).
40. See Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195 AUt. 901 (1938).
41. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960), examples (1) and (2).
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be diffused by the use of high quorum requirements on the board of
directors 42 or for stockholders' meetings43 and of extra-majority voting
requirements," and agreements among stockholders can often obligate
such stockholders to vote for specified action. 45 Although control can
be diffused or centralized under both the corporate and partnership
forms of organization, however, the limited liability which can be
conferred upon a limited partner will be destroyed by section 7 of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act whenever such limited partner "takes
part in the control of the business." 46 While it would appear that the
draftsmen of that act contemplated that a limited partner might
exercise some degree of control over the conduct of the business in
which he invested without forfeiting his limited liability,47 they
failed
48
to specify in the act how much control was permissible.

Such

omission in the act combined with the paucity of cases 49 which have
42. E.g., Nmv YORK STOCK CORP. LAW § 9(b); NEw YoRK Bus. CoaP. LAW §
709(a)(1) (effective Sept. 1,1963).
43. E.g., Nmv YoRx STOCK CORP. LAW § 9(c); Nmv YonK Bus. ConP. LAW §
616(a)(1) (effective Sept. 1,1963).
44. E.g., Nmv Yonx STOCK CoRP. LAW §§ 9(b), (d); Nmv YoRK Bus. CoRP. LAW
§9 616(a)(2), 709(a)(2) (effective Sept. 1, 1963). See also Katcher v. Ohsman, 26
N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. 1953). But see Bator v. United Sausage Co.,
138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112,
60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); Goldfarb v. Dorset Prods., Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). Cf. Mook v. Berger, 6 N.Y.2d 833, 159 N.E.2d 702 (1959). Cf. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEM.
PROB. 435, 442 (1958); O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power To Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, id. at 451, 454; O'Neal,
Moulding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter
Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1956). The flexibility of a voting trust device may be
restricted in so far as trust law principles are read into the law governing such device.
See Note, Control Devices, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 375, 378-79 (1957).
45. Compare Storer v. Ripley, 1 Misc. 2d 235, 125 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 950, 125 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1953).
46. UNnoRm Lin'an PARTNmasrm ACT § 7.
47. See Commissioners' Note following § 1 of the UNIFORM LirTED PMaRTNIMSimp
ACT:
"The draft herewith submitted proceeds on the following assumptions:
"First: No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital of a
business, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of control over the
conduct of the business, to become bound for the obligations of the business; provided
creditors have no reason to believe at the times their credits were extended that such
person was so bound." (Emphasis added.)
Similar language, also without explanation of the amount of permissible control is
found in Lewis, The Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 723
(1917).
48. Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which imposes unlimited
liability on a limited partner who "takes part in the control of the business" does not
define "control' and "contror' is not defined elsewhere in the act. See Note, Tile
Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 902-06 (1936).
49. Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959); Baumer Foods,
Inc. v. Griflith, 166 F.2d 433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828 (1948); Bergeson
v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150, 159 (D. Utah 1958), aff'd In part
and rev'd in part, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959);
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construed section 7 has resulted in removing much of the usefulness

that the limited partnership device was intended to possess. It has
been suggested that a profit sharing creditor may be permitted a
greater exercise of control over a business enterprise without incurring
exposure to personal liability for business debts if such investor wears
the garb of a creditor rather than that of a limited partner. 50 While
the suggestion may have some validity with respect to the tendencies

of courts in deciding cases, any existent policy reasons behind such
distinction are not immediately apparent. Thus while a profit sharing
creditor has sometimes been allowed a broad veto power on the
ground that such power was necessary for the protection of his

investment,51 the same justifying reason could be urged on behalf
of a limited partner, and perhaps with more force since his investment
is a subordinated one in respect of return of capital as well as return
on capital.52 If the profit sharing creditor has a subordinated claim
to principal as well as to a return on such principal, then his interest

Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Holman v. De Escamila, 86
Cal. App. 858, 195 P.2d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Sivola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522,
272 P.2d 287 (1954); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950); of.
Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 54, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d
200 (9th Cir. 1962); Toor v. Westover, 94 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd orm
other grounds, 200 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 975 (1953).
50. Note, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 906 (1936):
"[Although under the most liberal interpretation of Section 7, the tests as to
that degree of participation which will result in the imposition of partnership liability
upon the general investor and the limited partner may be alike in vacuo, the former
may be able to acquire certain privileges which, if exercised by a limited partner,
would probably be held to violate Section 7 .... the courts have allowed the [profit
sharing investor] ... an extensive veto power, on the ground that it constitutes security
for the investment. In a contract of limited partnership, the reservation of any comprehensive privileges cannot so well be made to appear as security."
51. See Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 221-22, 158 N.E. 77, 79-80 (1927), where
the court refused to hold that three defendants were personally liable for the debts
of a partnership to which they had transferred a large amount of liquid securities in
return for 40% of the profits of the partnership until such securities were returned.
Although two of such defendants, in the capacity of "trustees" for themselves and the
other transferor possessed a broad veto power over partnership transactions, the court
refused to find that the defendants thereby became "partners" in such partnership:
"The trustees . . .may veto any business they think highly speculative or injurious. Again we hold this but a proper precaution to safeguard the loan. The
trustees may not initiate any transaction as a partner may do. They may not bind
the firm by any action of their own. Under the circumstances the safety of the
loan depended upon the business success of K. N. & K. [the partnership]. This
success was likely to be compromised by the inclination of its members to engage in
speculation. No longer, if the respondents were to be protected, should it be
allowed. The trustees therefore might prohibit it, and that their prohibition might be
effective, information was to be furnished them. Not dissimilar agreements have
been held proper to guard the interests of the lender."
Compare Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II, 38 YALE L.J. 720,
730-31 (1929). See also Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards, L.R. 4 P.C. 419
(1872).
52. UNiFOrm Lnrrau PAnnms
AcT §§ 15, 16, 23.
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to that of a limited partner who has made an investment

for a similar duration 54 and similar rules should govern both. Whether

or not the kinds of control which a limited partner may possess
consonant with the limitation on his liability ultimately is equated

by the courts with the negative control which apparently55 can be

vested in a profit sharing creditor, s6 the amount of control which may
be exercised by a limited partner consonant with the statutory limitation on his liability is presently uncertain, 57 and from the viewpoint
of business planning, the problem is compounded by the limitations
on the discretion of the draftsman of a limited partnership certificate
which safety considerations may impose. While in some instances the
partnership form may be able to meet the demands of a new investor
for profit sharing, limited liability and some form of control participation by clothing such investor in the garb of a creditor and vesting
him with a broad veto power, the flexibility of the partnership form
even as expanded by the use of the profit sharing creditor device
53. The financial statements of the partnership would, however, probably differ,
depending upon whether an investor's interest is denominated as a limited partnership
interest or as a creditor interest.
54. It has been suggested that the profit sharing creditor device may not be capable
of combining "participation in the management" with "a continuing stake in the enterprise." Note, The Limited Partnership,supra note 50, at 906 n.52; cf. Pooley v. Driver,
L.R. 5 Ch. 458, 479, 482 (1876).
55. See Martin v. Peyton, supra note 51; cf. Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards,
supra note 51. See also Note, The Limited Partnership,supra note 48.
56. The suggestion that the criteria for judging the amounts of control permissible to
the limited partner and the profit sharing creditor may be the same was made in Note,
The Limited Partnership, supra note 48, at 903-04:
"[I]t may be maintained that when the Act provides that the limited partner shall
be liable as a general partner when he takes part in the 'control' of the business, the
'control' referred to constitutes the same standard as that used to determine partnership liability apart from the Act."
57. It would seem that a limited partner may offer advice without destroying his
limited liability. Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, supra note 49, at 60; Toor v. Westover,
supra note 49, at 863; Sivola v. Rowlett, supra note 49; cf. Madison County Bank v.
Gould, 5 Hill 309 (N.Y. 1842). Some further amount of participation in partnership
affairs may not result in personal liability for partnership debts. Baumer Foods, Inc. v.
Griffith, 166 F.2d 433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828 (1948); Rathke v. Griffith,
36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950). Cf. Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d
354 (1st Cir. 1959), which held that the selection by the limited partner of the general
sales manager of the business and a contractual provision establishing joint control by
such sales manager and the general partner of the financial aspects of the business, subject to the power of the general partner to discharge the sales manager and to end the
joint control by in effect buying out the limited partner's interest for a nominal sum, did
not subject the limited partner to personal liability under § 7 of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act. Compare Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 858, 195 P.2d 833
(Dist. Ct. App. 1948), where the limited partners lost their liability limitation through,
inter alia, selecting a manager. Compare the Plasteel case with a stricter view expressed in the pre-uniform act case of Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153, 156 (1861).
Compare also the powers permitted to be exercised in the above cases with the powers
of a limited partner under a pre-uniform act statute in New York described in First
Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 4 Lans. 34, 38-39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871).
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falls short of the varied combinations of control and limited liability
possible under the corporate form. Thus it would appear that
decisional law lends support only to a "negative" type of control
participation in partnership affairs by the profit sharing creditor;8
and it would further appear that in practice, and especially among
a closely knit group of people, the distinction between affirmative and
negative participation in control may become extremely hazy. 59
The adaptability of the corporate form to business structures involving "control" distribution incompatible with the section 7 condition or with a profit sharing creditor arrangement would increase in
importance when growth financing necessitates some sharing of
control with new equity investors. 60 Even in those partnership
structures in which all partners participate on an equal basis in
deciding most questions by majority vote,61 the vote which any individual partner has in decision-making bears an inverse ratio to the:
number of partners in the partnership; in such cases the imposition
of unlimited liability on partners dissenting from the transaction or
transactions giving rise to the failure of the business would accentuate the partnership disadvantage of unlimited liability. Growth58. Broad negative powers of control have been held not to transform a profit sharing
creditor into a partner in Martin v. Peyton, supra note 52. Compare the inference of'
an affirmative-negative distinction in Martin v. Peyton:
"The trustees may not initiate any transaction as a partner may do."
See also Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards, L.R. 4 P.C. 419, 436 (1872) in
wlhich a creditor was held not liable for business debts although he had power to direct
an enlargement of "the establishment," because he "had no initiative power." CompareA Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N.C.L. REV. 435, 505;
(1941) ("[Tihere is always the risk that he [the profit sharing creditor] will be found
to have spoken affirmatively and too loudly.") Cf. Note, The Limited Partnership, 45YALE L.J. 895, 906 (1936) ("Of course, the power to initiate and direct the executionof policy will result in the imposition of partnership liability upon either the limited.
partner or the profit-sharing investor.") The position that there is a clear line of distinction between a negative power of control or veto over predetermined action and anaffirmative power of control was also taken in Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II, 38 YALE L.J. 720, 730-31 (1929):
"A right to veto prices fixed or costs which have been determined upon is at best
a clumsy device for getting into force any policy desired. For practical purposes.
it probably even falls short of a backhanded way of fixing prices or determining costs.
Theoretically a thousand nays might be as effective as one yea. Actually business
is not and could not be run that way. The use to which such veto can best be
put, and for which it is devised, is as a check over improvident judgments, unwarranted acts, flagrant abuses of trust, etc. As a day-to-day business regulator it
fails."
It is not clear, however, that a veto power cannot be used to direct policy by letting
it be known in advance what courses of action will be acceptable to the holder of the
veto power. Furthermore, if the holder of the veto power is permitted to attend meetings of the decision making body of the partnership, the line between disapproving
unacceptable action and suggesting acceptable action would seem most hazy.
59. See note 58 supra.
60. See pp. 370-71 infra.
61. Compare UNIFORm PAnTNEasI AcT § 18(h).
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here in the number of owners, which might be a necessary incident
to growth in total assets-would exert an influence toward the adoption of the corporate form.62 Again, the partnership form would
probably not permit the delegation of substantial supervisory or
managerial authority to hired managers to be combined with substantial involvement in supervising or managing any of the operations
of the business, including supervision or management limited to
operations not so delegated, without risking personal liability for
business debts incurred by such hired managers. Thus when expansion
reaches the point where the original controlling owners require outside assistance in supervising the affairs of the business but are unwilling to relinquish their own participation in supervising and
managing, incorporation would increase in desirability.

IV.

TAX FAcroRs AND FiNcIA. SmRuacrU
AS RELATED TO GROWTH
A. TAX AND OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO FINANCING
EXPANSION OUT OF EARNINGS

Earnings from operations, if they exist, are a possible source from
which some expansion can be financed. Even when such earnings
are insufficient to finance the full amount of needed expansion, they
may supplement additional capital secured by the business from other
sources.
A decision as to the present advisability of incorporating a preexisting and growing partnership should normally be made only after
computing the financial needs of the business related to expansion
and the effects that incorporation would have on the ability of the
business to finance expansion out of earnings.6 3 Earnings on the
capital contributions of the owners will be taxed as earned at the
62. The adaptability of the corporate form to flexible arrangements of power allocation would also facilitate business expansion through the acquisition of independent
units. Thus in connection with the issuance to the owners of an acquired business
of a share in the equity of the acquiring business in payment for the former business'
assets, no necessity would arise of such owners being excluded from minority representation on the board of directors of the enlarged business under penalty of their assuming
a risk of personal liability for the acts of the majority. Cf. Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp.
of America, supra note 49.
63. The prime tax advantage of corporate tax treatment from a growth standpoint
is the lower tax rate applicable to reinvested earnings. Since the businesses under discussion have an unlimited asset-expansion capability, see pp. 351-52 supra, accumulation
without reinvestment to which INT. RBv. CODE oF 1954, § 535 would apply would
not generally occur. Even in the situation in which earnings are not reinvested, the
apparent "double taxation" of such earnings, see pp. 366-67 supra, may be nonexistent when such earnings are paid out in the form of tax-deductible salaries
or in the form of contributions to pension plans qualified under INT. Rxv. CoDE
oF 1954, § 401. During the early stages of operation when the owners are active
managers and prior to the commencement of a rapid growth process, therefore, the
corporate form may have an appeal based primarily on limited liability and pension plan
attributes superior to those available under an unincorporated form of organization. See
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average tax rate applicable to the owners if the partnership form is
retained, 64 unless the owners elect corporate tax treatment under
subchapter R.0 If the business is incorporated, however, such earnings will be taxed at the 30 to 52 per cent corporate rate,66 unless the
ownership structure qualifies for subchapter S treatment and the
owners elect such treatment. If the ownership structure does so
qualify and the owners do so elect, then such earnings will be attributed to the owners and will be taxed at the average individual tax
rates applicable to them.6 7 Since the percentage of earnings available
for reinvestment will be the reciprocal of the tax rate on such earnings, corporate tax treatment of the non-subchapter S variety will

result in more earnings being available for reinvestment whenever

the total tax which would be imposed on undistributed business
earnings if those earnings were attributed to the owners is in excess
of the applicable corporate tax on such earnings.
The growth stage at which corporate tax treatment-obtainable by
incorporation, or subsequent to incorporation by revocation6 of a
previously made election under subchapter S or by a partnership
electing under subchapter R-becomes advantageous from a standpoint of the taxation of retained earnings, however, cannot be de-

termined in the abstract. The variables, which must be determined in
Pugh, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans for Small Businesses, Texas Tech. Tax Institute, October 27, 1962, Lubbock, Texas. Later, the tax advantages connected with
growth will join with the advantages connected with liability limitation and pension
plan aspects and may supplant at least the latter as the primary appeal of the corporate
form to its owners.
64. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
65. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361.
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. At the present time a "normal" tax of 30 per
cent is imposed on all corporate income, id. § 11(b)(1), and a "surtax" of 22 per cent
is imposed on that part of the income of a corporation which exceeds $25,000, id. §
11(c). The total tax which applies to any given corporation thus may vary in amount
from 30 per cent to an amount approaching 52 per cent. In the absence of a change
in the Code, the normal tax will be reduced to 25 per cent starting with taxable years
beginning after June 30, 1963.
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1372, 1373. Subchapter S treatment is available only
to those corporations which have only one class of stock held by not more than ten
shareholders all of which are either individuals or estates and none of which are
nonresident aliens. Id. § 1371(a). Furthermore an election under the subchapter
terminates in any taxable year when the electing corporation derives more than 80
per cent of its gross receipts from sources outside the United States. Such election also
terminates in any taxable year in which more than 20 per cent of such corporation's
gross receipts are derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales
or exchanges of stock or securities. Id. §§ 1372(e) (4),(5). The restrictions placed
on the capitalization and the ownership of shares in a subchapter S corporation
would appear to make the benefits of that subchapter available only in the early
stages of growth, since most businesses in the process of expansion would require an
enlargement of their ownership structure, and the addition of new shareholders would
-eventually result in disqualification under that subehapter.
68. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(2). Section 1372(e)(1) may also provide
a means of revocation.
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every given case, include the amount of anticipated business earnings
and the accompanying substantial variation in the corporate tax rate
from the 30 per cent low to a high of an amount approaching 52
per cent, the number of partners or other owners among whom the
income of the business is attributed for tax purposes and the outside
activities of such owners. Thus, all other factors (including ownership shares) being equal, the greater the number of owners among
whom the income of a partnership or subchapter S corporation is
deemed distributed, the greater is the amount of business income
which would be requisite to make the corporate tax rate a lower one.
There are some limits or hindrances, however, to financial structure
composed of a large number of partnership interests, 69 and the number of owners of a corporation receiving subchapter S treatment cannot exceed ten. 0 Moreover, no conclusion can be based on the
business income and the number of partners or other owners without
taking into account the relative shares of that income attributable to
each such partner or other owner and the individual tax rate which
is applicable to each such share, as affected by the items of income
and deduction applicable to such partner or other owner which arise
from his activities or property interests apart from the business.
Although corporate tax treatment may free more earnings for
reinvestment, it may also entail an additional tax upon each of the
owners whenever such reinvested earnings are returned to him 7' or
whenever he realizes the benefit of such reinvestment by selling his
shares for cash.72 The reinvested earnings of a corporation will be
taxable to each shareholder upon his sale of stock in the enterprise
(more than six months after its acquisition) or upon liquidation of
the business at not more than the maximum capital gains rate of 25
per cent,7 3 thus if no earnings were distributed as dividends, the total
tax burden on corporate earnings borne by each of the shareholders
would be not in excess of 30 to 52 per cent times earnings plus 25 per
cent times 70 to 48 per cent times earnings, or a maximum of 64 per
cent times earnings.7 4 Thus the 25 per cent maximum capital gains tax
69. Seep. 371 infra.
70. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(1). But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g)
(1959). See note 67 supra.
71. Such owner will be taxed at ordinary income rates if such earnings are returned
in the form of a dividend. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301(a). He will be taxed at
capital gains rates, however, if such earnings are returned on liquidation of the corporation. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331, 1201, 1202.
72. If such sale occurred more than six months after the shareholder acquired such

shares, the tax imposed upon him would be at capital gains rates.

INT. RE:v

CODe OF

1954, §§ 1222(3), 1201, 1202.

73. See note 72 supra.
74. The corporate rates times earnings times the maximum capital gains rate
times the reciprocals of the corporate rates.
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amounts in effect to a maximum additional 12 per cent tax on the
earnings of the corporation7 5 However, since the additional capital
gains tax will be paid by the shareholders, the amount of earnings
available for reinvestment is not affected by such additional tax
liability; furthermore, the additional 25 per cent maximum capital
gains tax on each shareholder's pro rata share of retained earnings
could be considered by the shareholders as the price imposed for the
use of funds by the business until dissolution (or in the case of a
sale of stock by a shareholder, until such sale), or a charge not unlike
interest; thus in a situation in which a business reinvested anT equal
amount of earnings each year for 25 years and then liquidated, such a
hypothetical interest charge would work out to be in effect a two
per cent annual charge on annual average earnings.

B. Exrm NAL FiAN cING
From the point of view of the original owners, the most desirable
type of outside financing would be that which would entail the smallest charge on the earnings of the business and under which they
would surrender as little control as possible over the workings of the
business.
The total charge on earnings with respect to funds invested in a
business is a composite of taxes on such earnings plus interest or other
payments paid to investors as compensation for the use of such funds
less any tax reduction associated with those payments or otherwise
connected with the method of obtaining such funds. The rate of such
compensation or the rate of return demanded by a person supplying
funds to a business would appear to reflect both the risk of 1oss76 by
such investor and the risk of not receiving a return on such investment
each year2 7 Thus a secured creditor may demand less of a return on
investment than would persons having an inferior claim on assets
such as a preferred stockholder, a limited partner or a subordinated
creditor. Similarly, purchasers of securities having a prior claim on
earnings may demand less of a return than purchasers of securities or
other interests having an inferior claim; thus the return demanded
by the holder of a note or bond having a right to fixed yearly interest
payments might be less than the return demanded by the holder of
an income debenture, a non-participating preferred stockholder, or a
75. 52 per cent X earnings + 25 per cent

X

48 per cent X earnings = 52 per

cent X earnings + 12 per cent X earnings = 64 per cent X earnings. 64 per cent 52 per cent = 12 per cent. Cf. Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and
Section 1244, 14 TAX L. REv. 453, 460-61 (1959). Compare Garcia, When Should a
Sole ProprietorIncorporateHis Business To Save Income Taxes?, 35 TAXIES 110 (1957);
Note, Corporate Formation, 52 Nw. U.L. RBv. 352, 358 (1957).
76. 1 DmviNG, FiN~AcrAL PoLicy oF ConpoRATIoNs 136, 182 (5th ed. 1953).
77. 1 id. at 137.
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limited partner whose right to share in annual earnings is limited to
an amount equal to a percentage of his investment. A fortiori, it
would be less than the share of earnings of a general partner or common stockholder, since the latter ordinarily possess the least preferred
claim on earnings but an unlimited participation. The total charge
on earnings available for reinvestment, however, will be an amount
equal to the out-of-pocket payments constituting such return less any
tax reduction associated with those payments or otherwise connected
with the method of financing adopted.
1. Financingby Means of Interests Carryinga Right to a Fixed
Return on Investment or a Right to a Limited
ParticipationIn Earnings

Debt financing, often, but not always, legally obligates the borrower
to pay a fixed return on the amount of the loan to the lender; failure
to pay such fixed return places the borrower in default and subjects
him to the penalties provided in the underlying loan agreement with
respect to such default, often including the acceleration of the date
on which payment of the entire principal of the loan is due.78 The

penalties to which the borrower is potentially subject can be substantially mitigated while some degree of protection to the lender can
be retained by conditioning the lender's right to a periodic return on
investment upon the adequacy of the borrower's earnings and by
making the right to such payments cumulative, so that an interest
payment which is passed because of insufficient earnings is not lost,
but will be payable together with interest payments relating to subsequent years if and when the subsequent earnings of the business
warrant . 9 The holder of such a debt obligation dependent upon the
earnings of the business possesses rights closely resembling those of a
preferred stockholder 0 and those of a limited or general partner
whose right to share in the annual earnings of the partnership is
limited by contract to a percentage of his investment. Since debt,
both fixed interest and interest-dependent-upon-earnings variety,
preferred stock, and limited or general partnership interests whose
participation in earnings are limited to a percentage of the capital
represented by such interests possess the common characteristic of
not sharing in the earnings equity of the business, they will be treated
together in considering possible sources of new investment funds and
78. See, e.g., 2 RBwIN & JOHNSON, CUPXNT LEGAL FORMS WrrH TAX ANALYsis §
6.66, at 872 (1961).
79. See, e.g., 3 FLrrcHEr, COR'oRA-ioN FORms ANNOTATED § 2550 (1958).
80. Compare Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1039
(1959), aff'd on this point and modified on other grounds, 283 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.
1960), vacated on other grounds, 367 U.S. 906 (1961); cf. John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r,
326 U.S. 521 (1946).
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the relation of such sources to the form of business organization.
In the case of partnership financing, the type of interest taken by
one or more outside investors may affect the amount of earnings
available for reinvestment because the determination of how and
among whom the deductions available in connection with the operation of the partnership business are to be allocated may depend upon
whether the funds secured from outside sources have been loan funds
or capital contributions by limited or general partners. Thus an
investment in the form of a limited or general partnership interest
would seem to entitle its holder to a share in the deductions arising
in connection with the operation of the partnership business,8 ' while
an investment in the form of a loan would not. Securing growth
funds by means of a loan or loans, therefore, might be preferable to
securing such funds by the sale of partnership interests, not only
because of the lower return on investment which might in some
circumstances be payable in connection with the former, but also
because such financing would reserve to the original partners the
benefit of the deductions arising in connection with the operation of
the partnership business.82 To the extent that the loss of such tax
benefit to the outside investors in the case of outside investment
taking the form of limited or general partnership interests would be
offset by a reduction in the amount of return demanded by such
investors and to the extent that the partnership would be forced
by its credit position or prior loan agreements or otherwise to subordinate claims attaching to new investment funds to some or all of its
other creditors, the total charge-on-earnings differential between loan
funds and limited or general partnership funds would narrow or be
eliminated. In such event the amount and kinds of control and
supervision desired by the outside investor over the activities of the
partnership might, in conjunction with a desire to avoid risking personal liability for business debts, induce the investor to insist upon
utilizing the loan route; thus, for example, some exercise of control over
business affairs through the use by an investor of a broad veto power
would seem to entail less danger that unlimited liability will be
imposed upon him if he possesses the status 3of a non-profit sharing
creditor than the status of a limited partner.
81. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 702, 704(b). It would appear at least doubtful
whether the partnership agreement or limited partnership certificate could allocate loss
items for tax purposes to one or more partners to the exclusion of other partners
when the respective shares of income and losses bore no relation to the tax allocation.
See 6 METNs, FEiDERAL INCom TAXATION § 35.29, at 92 (1957).
82. The effect of § 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act might also discourage financing
through the sale of general partnership interests. See note 11 supra.
83. Compare pp. 360-63 supra and note 51 supra. See Waldie v. Steers Sand &
Gravel Corp., 54 F. Supp. 585, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd in part and ree'd in part,
151 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1945) (lender's countersigning all checks drawn on account
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In the case of growth financing of an incorporated business, the
most beneficial tax treatment will be obtained through the use of debt
capital, since the interest payments made to the lender in connection
with a loan will be deductible" from the corporate income subject
to tax, while a return on investment paid to the holder of an "ownership" interest in the corporation would not be so deductible."- Although the lower interest rate which might be payable in connection
with secured or unsubordinated fixed interest debt would increase
the advantage of debt financing, the tax advantage of such financing
would continue to make it the most desirable route in respect of
conserving the greatest amount of earnings for reinvestment even
when contractual commitments or general prudence dictated the use
of subordinated loans with interest payable out of income. In either
the partnership or the corporate form, however, the injection of a
sinking fund requirement in a loan or other investment arrangement
may reduce the amount of earnings available for reinvestment to the
extent of the required sinking fund payments. 86
2. Financingby Means of "Equity" Interests
Equity interests, in the sense here used, comprise those interests
which entitle investors to given percentage shares of earnings as
distinguished from interests entitling their holders to given percentage
returns on their investments or to given percentage returns on their
investments so far as earnings will allow. The normal holder of such
an equity interest would be a common stockholder, a general partner,
or a limited partner whose right to share in earnings is not contractually restricted to an amount equal to a percentage of his investment;
a profit sharing "creditor" also would hold an equity interest in the
sense here used. Assuming adequate contractual protection against
"dilution" of their interests by the sale by the business of other similar
interests at inadequate prices, increased profits resulting from an
increased amount of assets would accrue to the benefit of the holders
of equity interests.
Since financing growth by selling additional equity interests would
confer some of the benefits of such growth on the purchasers of such
interests, such financing would tend, in many instances, to be less
composed of loaned funds and business receipts of borrower held not to make a
lender a partner). Since the type of investment here involved is a non-profit-sharing
one, the danger of the imposition of partnership liability on the holder of an investment
in creditor form would seem less than when an investment in such form was a profit
sharing one.
84. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(c) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6593, 1962-1 Cm. BULL. 22.
86. See Donaldson, In Defense of Preferred Stock, in Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct.
1962, pp. 123, 133.
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favored than debt financing or other financing involving a charge on,
as distinguished from a share in, earnings. Equity financing would
also be discouraged by the fact that purchasers of such interests, because their claims on earnings and, in most cases, on assets would be
the least preferred of all classes of investor claims, would frequently
be influenced to demand some voice in the operational control of the
business. 87 Debt financing involving a fixed return on investment,
however, can not be undertaken by the business indefinitely; the
predictable earnings of the business, the asset-debt ratio, other accounting ratios, and general prudence will limit the amount of debt
that a business can sustain at any given time.8 8 Even debt and other
inancing involving charges which fluctuate with earnings may not be
incurred beyond the point at which there ceases to be a reasonable
likelihood that earnings in excess of the upper limits of such fluctuations will be left over for the holders of the equity. Furthermore, to
the extent that charges on, rather than participation in, earnings is
involved in an investment, the possibility of future growth from
internal sources is eliminated. At some point, therefore, equity financing, despite its unfavorable aspects, may be compelled.
Equity financing of a partnership business through the sale of general partnership interests would be feasible only to a limited extent.
The sale of any substantial number of such interests would be impeded by the unlimited liability for business debts to which every
general partner is potentially subject. Furthermore, the sale of a
substantial number of general partnership interests might enlarge
the number of general partners to the point where some delegation of
control over operations to a central group might become necessary;8 9
the existence or the prospect of such centralization might further aggravate the difficulties involved in making such sales because such
centralization of decision-making could not be accompanied by limitations on the liabilities of partners not members of the central group.
Equity financing through the sale of limited partnership interests
might be inhibited by a reluctance of investors to foreswear exercise
of the control conditionally prohibited by section 7 and an accompanying reluctance to risk personal liability. The sale of any substantial number of such interests would also be inhibited by the legal
87. See pp. 371-72 infra.
88. See 2 DEwING, FiNANCrAL PoLIcy OF CORPORAMONS 1026-27 (5th ed. 1953);
FnNEY, PRncIPLEs OF AccouN c-INTmwmrAT 543-44 (3d ed. 1946). Cf. Donaldson, supra note 86, at 133.
89. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960):
"The effective operation of a business organization composed of many members
generally depends upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive
authority to make management decisions for the organization, and therefore,
centralized management is more likely to be found in such an organization than in
a smaller organization."
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impediments to transfers of such interests. Although the profit-sharing
creditor device might provide a workable form for one or a few
investor interests where limited partnership interests were not
feasible, that device also entails risk that personal liability may be
imposed on the investors when combined with some types of control
participation. 90
Equity financing through the sale of stock in an incorporated business, however, would not be exposed to the foregoing difficulties. The
personal liability problem and the related problems connected with
centralization and control participation would be eliminated by the
corporate capacity of permitting any combination of participation in
profits and exercise of control with liability limited to investment.
Thus not only could new investors be issued equity interests represented by additional shares of stock identical to those possessed by
the existing owners, but new shares could be tailored to fit the
exact claims in respect of shares in earnings and powers of control
demanded by such investors and agreed upon by such owners.
Unlimited participation in profits or participation up to a limit could
be combined with continuing minority representation on the board
of directors or such representation only in the event of default in certain agreed-upon provisions governing the investment or majority or
exclusive representation upon such default and during such default
period. Moreover, sihce the only legal impediments to transfers-ofinterests in corporations are the result of contract, charter or by-law
provision, such impediments can be removed by the owners when
desired; and if and when the owners decide to sell many equity
interests, the reasons for maintaining transfer restrictions over such
interests would disappear. 9'
If only one or a few equity interests are to be sold, the corporate
form may contain some further advantage to the extent the
prospective purchasers of such interests are themselves incorporated. In such event there may be a possibility of narrowing the
percentage share of the earnings equity that would have to be
transferred to such investor beyond the percentage share of such
equity that would have to be transferred to an individual or other
unincorporated purchaser, or which would have to be transferred to
the same investor if the business in which the investment is to be
made were a partnership. Such result might be achieved if the
business in which the investment is made makes full use in the
negotiating phase of the transaction of the tax deduction accorded
a corporate recipient of dividend income in the amount of 85 per cent
90. See pp. 362-63 and note 58 supra.
91. See p. 354 supra.

1963]

PARTNERSHIP INTO CORPORATION

of income so received, 92 since the effect of such deduction would be
to make every dollar paid as a dividend on stock worth to its corporate recipient slightly less than twice9 3 as much as a dollar received
as a distribution of the profits of a partnership.
The corporate form might also possess some advantage in the situation in which the original owners of the business failed to expand
its ownership base in step with its asset expansion, but instead had
caused it to acquire a disproportionate amount of debt and a correspondingly unattractive appearance as an investment prospect to
conservative investors. Even though such a business was unable to
find purchasers for its pure equity or debt interests, if it possessed
growth possibilities it might nevertheless be possible to use such
growth potential as a partial inducement for one or more investors to
supply funds needed by such business for such growth by offering to
such investor or investors options on the business' earnings equity
combined with debt interests, thus combining the speculative advantages of an equity investment with some degree of creditor protection.
While it might be theoretically possible for a partnership to grant an
option to purchase a right to share in its profits to a lender in conjunction with a loan,9 such an interest might be found to be unmarketable because possible purchasers might doubt their ability to
resell such interest as well as the continued existence of the partnership. 95 A more practical alternative might be the sale by a corporation
of debt instruments which are either convertible into common stock
or have attached to them warrants to purchase common stock;9 the
92. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a).
93. The investor would realize $.48 on each dollar received as interest. The effect of
the dividend deduction would permit the investor to realize the same amount, i.e.,
$.48, if $.52 were paid by the payor by way of dividend:
x-[.15x(.52)]=1-.52(1)
X-.078X = .48
.922X = .48
X = .52039
The cost to the payor would still be less if interest payments were made, however, by
$.04039.
94. See Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 222-23, 158 N.E. 77, 80 (1927), in which
such an option was granted.
95. Resale of an option on a general partnership interest might be prohibited by the
contract of sale, since general partners would not normally obligate themselves in advance to accept a subsequent vendee as a partner. Resale of an option on a limited
partnership interest would be inhibited insofar as the interest contained no safeguards
against improvident action by the general partners. The resale of both types of
options might be inhibited by uncertainty as to the continuance of the partnership in
existence. See note 8 supra.
96. Detachable warrants attached to debt instruments would enable the purchaser
of such instruments to share in the growth of the issuer even after the debt instruments
had been paid or sold. Compare S. REP. No. 833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959),
note 102 infra. Although the issuance of convertible securities and warrants has been
subject to some criticism on the ground that the corporate issuer and its stockholders
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easier transferability of such interests might be helpful in securing a
purchaser for such instruments, since to the extent the purchaser was
assured of some degree of transferability he would have some of the
freedom of liquidity 97 although he had no present intention of using
it. Such a transaction would not only supply some of the capital
presently required by the business, but, if the business grew as anticipated and the purchaser accordingly converted the debt instruments
or exercised the warrants attached to them, it might also assist in pulling the business out of its difficult debt position-through the substitution of equity for debt capital in the former case and through the
injection of further equity capital and a possible improvement in the
asset-debt ratio in the latter-and into a stage of ownership base
expansion. If the purchaser sold to the public9 8 either the debt
instruments or the stock which he had obtained by conversion or
exercise of warrants, the business would also be assisted into the stage
of public trading of its stock.99
An incorporated 00 business which possesses growth possibilities,
but is in the overextended debt position described, and which cannot
obtain a purchaser for its debt instruments from usual sources even
by combining an option on its equity with such instruments, may be
able to sell such instruments to a Small Business Investment Corporation. The willingness of such a purchaser to acquire such instruments
would result from the enhancement of the inherent investment attractions of a combination of a debt security and an option on the
equity of the debtor' 01 which is brought about by tax provisions deare not always fully cognizant of the extent to which corporate stock may, as a
result of such issuance, be required to be sold at a bargain price and the extent to
which the equities of the existing shareholders may thereby become diluted, the
issuance of convertible securities or of warrants would seem justified where such
issuance is a sine qua non of a loan. Cf. BERLE & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 201-02 (1932):
"[W]here a corporation as a last resort is forced to issue warrants as . . . additional

'sweetening' to make bonds more attractive, or otherwise, in order to get money
which it needs to avoid disaster or serious trouble, the financing can be supported,
on the ground that it is this or nothing."
97. Liquidity would seem often to constitute an important component of value. Cf.
Hornstein, supra note 44, at 446; McLain, supra note 3, at 38. Cf. note 1 supra.
98. Sale of such instruments to the public might require registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 unless an exemption were available. See Securities Act of 1933,
§§ 5, 4, 2(11), 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d, 77b(11) (1958). See also SEC
Rule 155, 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (Supp. 1963).
99. See p. 352 supra.
100. Small Business Investment Companies are authorized to invest in convertible
debentures of incorporated "small business concerns." Small Business Investment Act of
1958, § 304, 72 Stat. 689, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 684 (Supp. III, 1962). They are
authorized only to grant long term loans to unincorporated small business concerns.
Id. § 305, 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 685 (1958). For the reasons stated in text, however, in most cases a sale of an option of a share of the equity of a partnership might
not be very marketable even were such an investment authorized.
101. See p. 373 supra.
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signed to encourage investment by Small Business Investment Corporations in incorporated "small business concerns" in the form of
convertible debentures. 1 2 These provisions reduce the impact of a
loss incurred on convertible debentures and stock acquired pursuant
to such conversion privilege by permitting such loss to be treated as
an ordinary income loss;103 they also encourage the holding of equity
interests by making the receipt of dividends by a Small Business
Investment Corporation from a "small business concern" tax free.104
Such enhancement would also be present in cases in which the business could obtain funds from other sources; in such cases the
foregoing factors would enable the Small Business Investment Corporation to receive, at a lower yield on its investment, the benefits
received by another investor at a higher yield, and accordingly might
enable the business to obtain its required financing at a lower cost
from a Small Business Investment Corporation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion would indicate that the corporate form
would normally become increasingly advantageous to the owners of a
business as the business grows in the size of its asset base, in the size
of its earning power, and in the number of its equity owners. Corporate advantages are related to the limited liability feature of the
corporate form, which becomes increasingly meaningful as the expansion of the business' scope of operations releases the business from
reliance on owner guarantees and as the sizes of business commitments
become increasingly larger in proportion to the financial resources of
its owners. They are also related to the connection between liability
limitation and the control structure, especially in the light of the
increasingly centralized control structure that growth will necessitate
and the comparative lack of adaptability of the limited partnership
102. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1243, 243(b). Prior to 1960 convertible debentures were the only form of investment in which Small Business Investment Companies
were authorized to invest. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, § 304(b) (3), 72
Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C. § 684(b) (3) (1958). In 1960 the act was amended to permit
investment by Small Business Investment Companies in small business concerns by
means other than the purchase of convertible debentures. 74 Stat. 196, 15 U.S.C. §
684 (Supp. III, 1962). Compare S. RE1P. No. 833, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1959):
"The greater flexibility obtained by this amendment of section 304 would permit,
among other forms, the issuance of debentures with detachable warrants. In this
situation the SBIC could recapture the principle amount advanced, either by
disposition of the debenture in a secondary market, or by repayment, and still
retain an opportunity for some profit for the risk taken."
Although the act itself was amended, the related § 1243 of the Internal Revenue Code
which provides ordinary loss treatment for Small Business Investment Companies with
respect to losses on convertible debentures was not amended to conform to the change

in § 304.
103. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1243.
104. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(b).
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form to an intermediately centralized control structure. They are
related to the comparative freedom of transferability of interest which
the corporate form can afford and which will become increasingly
important as the number of owners increases. They are also related
to the effect of taxation on the availability of earnings for reinvestment
and to variations in financial structure to which the corporate form is
adptable.
This correlation of attractiveness with growth possessed by the corporate form is due in most part not to the inability of the partnership
form to imitate various corporate attributes, but to the inability of that
form to combine such attributes in one business organization. Thus
the partnership form can possess a control structure of any degree
of centralization, it can confer limited liability on the vast majority
of its members, it can receive the benefits of corporate taxation of
earnings, its members can possess various and sundry rights to receive
information and to inspect books, and its members can transfer their
rights to receive business earnings without legal hindrance. However,
the combination of such of the foregoing attributes as are desirable
in any given case in one business organization can often be accomplished only if the business is incorporated, and the combination of
all of such attributes in one organization would be impossible other
than in a corporation.
When incorporation becomes desirable in a specific case, however,
can be determined only by balancing the combination of business
attributes deemed desirable (including attributes not primarily connected with growth) against those aspects of corporate tax treatment
and contractually unmodifiable corporate attributes which are undesired in the context of the concrete case. Thus, for example, the
point in growth at which the interplay of limited liability and the
control structure would make incorporation particularly desirable may
not coincide with the point at which the tax consequences of incorporation would be beneficial.

